The TPNW: How is your country doing?

The TPNW: How is your country doing?

Find out if your country has joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – and which cities, parliamentarians, and local organisations are supporting it.

How is your country doing?

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ICAN Tools for Activists and Campaigners

ICAN Tools for Activists and Campaigners

ICAN Tools for Activists and Campaigners

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Global Zero Nuclear Crisis Group

Global Zero Nuclear Crisis Group

NATO and Russia. North Korea and the United States. India and Pakistan. The United States and China. These tense international relationships share one thing in common: each has the potential to quickly worsen into military confrontation that could spark the use of nuclear weapons. Each is a Cuban Missile Crisis in the making.

Confronted for the first time with multiple flashpoints that could go nuclear with little or no warning, the world is in uncharted waters. To help steer us safely through these dangers, Global Zero launched the Nuclear Crisis Group, a crack team of top former nuclear commanders, diplomats, and national security experts who monitor these volatile situations and put forward actionable plans to defuse them — and prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

Check out the latest from Nuclear Crisis Group:

Global Zero’s Plan for Reaching Zero Nuclear Weapons

Reaching Zero

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Podcast: Nuclear Winter with Alan Robock and Brian Toon

FLI Podcast: Nuclear Winter with Alan Robock and Brian Toon

Meteorologist Alan Robock from Rutgers University and physicist Brian Toon from the University of Colorado discuss what is potentially the most devastating consequence of nuclear war: nuclear winter.

Toon and Robock have studied and modeled nuclear winter off and on for over 30 years, and they joined forces ten years ago to use newer climate models to look at the climate effects of a small nuclear war. You can find their research and other work on nuclear winter on Robock’s nuclear winter page.

The following interview has been heavily edited, but you can listen to it in its entirety here or read the complete transcript here.

Ariel: How is it that you two started working together?

Toon: This was initiated by a reporter. At the time, Pakistan and India were having a conflict over Kashmir and threatening each other with nuclear weapons. A reporter wanted to know what effect this might have on the rest of the planet. I calculated the amount of smoke and found, “Wow that was a lot of smoke!”

Alan had a great volcano model, so at the American Geophysical Union meeting that year, I tried to convince him to work on this problem. Alan was pretty skeptical.

Robock: I don’t remember being skeptical. I remember being very interested. I said, “How much smoke would there be?” Brian told me 5,000,000 tons of smoke, and I said, “That sounds like a lot!”

We put it into a NASA climate model and found it would be the largest climate change in recorded human history. The basic physics is very simple. If you block out the Sun, it gets cold and dark at the Earth’s surface.

We hypothesized that if each country used half of their nuclear arsenal, that would be 50 weapons on each side. We assumed the simplest bomb, which is the size dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki — a 15 kiloton bomb.

The answer is the global average temperature would go down by about 1.5 degrees Celsius. In the middle of continents, temperature drops would be larger and last for a decade or more.

We took models that calculate agricultural productivity and calculated how wheat, corn, soybeans, and rice production would change. In the 5 years after this war, using less than 1% of the global arsenal on the other side of the world, global food production would go down by 20-40 percent for 5 years, and for the next 5 years, 10-20 percent.

Ariel: Could you address criticisms of whether or not the smoke would loft that high or spread globally?

Toon: The only people that have been critical are Alan and I. The Departments of Energy and Defense, which should be investigating this problem, have done absolutely nothing. No one has done studies of fire propagation in big cities — no fire department is going to go put out a nuclear fire.

As far as the rising smoke, we’ve had people investigate that and they all find the same things: it goes into the upper atmosphere and then self-lofts. But, these should be investigated by a range of scientists with a range of experiences.

Robock: What are the properties of the smoke? We assume it would be small, single, black particles. That needs to be investigated. What would happen to the particles as they sit in the stratosphere? Would they react with other particles? Would they degrade? Would they grow? There are additional questions and unknowns.

Toon: Alan made lists of the important issues. And we have gone to every agency that we can think of, and said, “Don’t you think someone should study this?” Basically, everyone we tried so far has said, “Well, that’s not my job.”

Ariel: Do you think there’s a chance then that as we acquired more information that even smaller nuclear wars could pose similar risks? Or is 100 nuclear weapons the minimum?

Robock: First, it’s hard to imagine how once a nuclear war starts, it could be limited. Communications are destroyed, people panic — how would people even be able to rationally have a nuclear war and stop?

Second, we don’t know. When you get down to small numbers, it depends on what city, what time of year, the weather that day. And we don’t want to emphasize India and Pakistan – any two nuclear countries could do this.

Toon: The most common thing that happens when we give a talk is someone will stand up and say, “Oh, but a war would only involve one nuclear weapon.” But the only nuclear war we’ve had, the nuclear power, the United States, used every weapon that it had on civilian targets.

If you have 1000 weapons and you’re afraid your adversary is going to attack you with their 1000 weapons, you’re not likely to just bomb them with one weapon.

Robock: Let me make one other point. If the United States attacked Russia on a first strike and Russia did nothing, the climate change resulting from that could kill almost everybody in the United States. We’d all starve to death because of the climate response. People used to think of this as mutually assured destruction, but really it’s being a suicide bomber: it’s self-assured destruction.
Ariel: What scares you most regarding nuclear weapons?

Toon: Politicians’ ignorance of the implications of using nuclear weapons. Russia sees our advances to keep Eastern European countries free — they see that as an attempt to move military forces near Russia where [NATO] could quickly attack them. There’s a lack of communication, a lack of understanding of [the] threat and how people see different things in different ways. So Russians feel threatened when we don’t even mean to threaten them.

Robock: What scares me is an accident. There have been a number of cases where we came very close to having nuclear war. Crazy people or mistakes could result in a nuclear war. Some teenaged hacker could get into the systems. We’ve been lucky to have gone 71 years without a second nuclear war. The only way to prevent it is to get rid of the nuclear weapons.

Toon: We have all these countries with 100 weapons. All those countries can attack anybody on the Earth and destroy most of the country. This is ridiculous, to develop a world where everybody can destroy anybody else on the planet. That’s what we’re moving toward.

Ariel: Is there anything else you think the public needs to understand about nuclear weapons or nuclear winter?

Robock: I would think about all of the countries that don’t have nuclear weapons. How did they make that decision? What can we learn from them?

The world agreed to a ban on chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions, land mines — but there’s no ban on the worst weapon of mass destruction, nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly voted next year to negotiate a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, which will be a first step towards reducing the arsenals and disarmament. But people have to get involved and demand it.

Toon: We’re not paying enough attention to nuclear weapons. The United States has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in building better nuclear weapons that we’re never going to use. Why don’t we invest that in schools or in public health or in infrastructure? Why invest it in worthless things we can’t use?

Podcast: UN Nuclear Weapons Ban with Beatrice Fihn and Susi Snyder

FLI Podcast: UN Nuclear Weapons Ban with Beatrice Fihn and Susi Snyder

The following interview took place just a couple months before the United Nations voted in favor of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. ICAN won the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts later that year.

In October, 2016, the United Nations passed a historic resolution to begin negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. Previous nuclear treaties have included the Test Ban Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in the 70 plus years of the United Nations, the countries have yet to agree on a treaty to completely ban nuclear weapons. The negotiations will begin this March. To discuss the importance of this event, Ariel interviewed Beatrice Fihn and Susi Snyder. Beatrice is the Executive Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, also known as ICAN, where she is leading a global campaign consisting of about 450 NGOs working together to prohibit nuclear weapons. Susi is the Nuclear Disarmament Program Manager for PAX in the Netherlands, and the principal author of the Don’t Bank on the Bomb series. She is an International Steering Group member of ICAN.

The following interview has been heavily edited for brevity, but you can listen to it in its entirety above or read the full transcript here.

ARIEL: First, Beatrice, you spearheaded much, if not all, of this effort. Can you explain: What is the ban? What will it cover? What’s going to be prohibited? And Susi, can you weigh in as well?

BEATRICE: So, it sounds counterintuitive, but nuclear weapons are really the only weapons of mass destruction that are not prohibited by an international treaty. We prohibited chemical weapons and biological weapons, landmines and cluster munitions—but nuclear weapons are still legal for some.

We’re hoping that this treaty will be a very clear-cut prohibition; that nuclear weapons are illegal because of the humanitarian consequences that they cause if used. And it should include things like using nuclear weapons, possessing nuclear weapons, transferring nuclear weapons, assisting with those kind of things. Basically, a very straightforward treaty that makes it clear that, under international law, nuclear weapons are unacceptable.

SUSI: This whole system where some people think that nuclear weapons are legal for them, but they’re illegal for others—that’s a problem. Negotiations are going to start to make nuclear weapons illegal for everybody.

The thing is, nobody can deal with the consequences of using nuclear weapons. What better cure than to prevent it? And the way to prevent it is to ban the weapons.

ARIEL: The UN has been trying to prohibit nuclear weapons since 1945. Why has it taken this long?

BEATRICE: There is no prohibition on nuclear weapons, but there are many treaties and many regulations governing nuclear weapons. Almost all governments in the world agree that nuclear weapons are really bad and they should be eliminated. It’s a strange situation where governments, including the two—Russia and the United States—with the most nuclear weapons, agree ‘these are really horrible weapons, we don’t think they should be used. But we don’t want to prohibit them, because it still kind of suits us that we have them.’

For a very long time, I think the whole world just accepted that nuclear weapons are around. They’re this kind of mythical weapons almost. Much more than just a weapon—they’re magic. They keep peace and stability, they ended World War II, they made sure that there was no big war in Europe during the Cold War. [But] nuclear weapons can’t fight the kind of threats that we face today: climate change, organized crime, terrorism. It’s not an appropriate weapon for this millennium.

SUSI: The thing is, also, now people are talking again. And when you start talking about what it is that nuclear weapons do, you get into the issue of the fact that what they do isn’t contained by a national border. A nuclear weapon detonation, even a small one, would have catastrophic effects and would resonate around the world.

There’s been a long-time focus of making these somehow acceptable; making it somehow okay to risk global annihilation, okay to risk catastrophe. And now it has become apparent to an overwhelming majority of governments that this is not okay.

ARIEL: The majority of countries don’t have nuclear weapons. There’s only a handful of countries that actually have nuclear weapons, and the U.S. and Russia have most of those. And it doesn’t look like the U.S. and Russia are going to agree to the ban. So, if it passes, what happens then? How does it get enforced?

SUSI: If you prohibit the making, having, using these weapons and the assistance with doing those things, we’re setting a stage to also prohibit the financing of the weapons. That’s one way I believe the ban treaty is going to have a direct and concrete impact on existing nuclear arsenals. Because all the nuclear weapon possessors are modernizing their arsenals, and most of them are using private contractors to do so. By stopping the financing that goes into these private contractors, we’re going to change the game.

One of the things we found in talking to financial institutions, is they are waiting and aching for a clear prohibition because right now the rules are fuzzy. It doesn’t matter if the U.S. and Russia sign on to have that kind of impact, because financial institutions operate with their headquarters in lots of other places. We’ve seen with other weapons systems that as soon as they’re prohibited, financial institutions back off, and producers know they’re losing the money because of the stigma associated with the weapon.

BEATRICE: I think that sometimes we forget that it’s more than nine states that are involved in nuclear weapons. Sure, there’s nine states: U.S., U.K., Russia, France, China India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.

But there are also five European states that have American nuclear weapons on their soil: Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey. And in addition to that, all of the NATO states and a couple of others—such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea—are a part of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

We’ve exposed these NATO states and nuclear umbrella states, for being a bit hypocritical. They like to think that they are promoters of disarmament, but they are ready to have nuclear weapons being used on others on their behalf. So, even countries like Norway, for example, who are a part of a nuclear weapons alliance and say that, you know, ‘the U.S. could use nuclear weapons to protect us.’ On what? Maybe cities, civilians in Russia or in China or something like that. And if we argue that people in Norway need to be protected by nuclear weapons—one of the safest countries in the world, richest countries in the world—why do we say that people in Iran can’t be protected by similar things? Or people in Lebanon, or anywhere else in the world?

This treaty makes it really clear who is okay with nuclear weapons and who isn’t. And that will create a lot of pressure on those states that enjoy the protection of nuclear weapons today, but are not really comfortable admitting it.

ARIEL: If you look at a map of the countries that opposed the resolution vs. the countries that either supported it or abstained, there is a Northern Hemisphere vs. Southern Hemisphere thing, where the majority of countries in North America, and Europe and Russia all oppose a ban, and the rest of the countries would like to see a ban. It seems that if a war were to break out between nuclear weapon countries, it would impact these northern countries more than the southern countries. I was wondering, is that the case?

BEATRICE: I think countries that have nuclear weapons somehow imagine that they are safer with them. But it makes them targets of nuclear weapons as well. It’s unlikely that anyone would use nuclear weapons to attack Senegal, for example. So I think that people in nuclear-armed states often forget that they are also the targets of nuclear weapons.

I find it very interesting as well. In some ways, we see this as a big fight for equality. A certain type of country—the richest countries in the world, the most militarily powerful with or without the nuclear weapons—have somehow taken power over the ability to destroy the entire earth. And now we’re seeing that other countries are demanding that that ends. And we see a lot of similarities to other power struggles—civil rights movements, women’s right to vote, the anti-Apartheid movement—where a powerful minority oppresses the rest of the world. And when there’s a big mobilization to change that, there’s obviously a lot of resistance. The powerful will never give up that absolute power that they have, voluntarily. I think that’s really what this treaty is about at this point.

SUSI: A lot of it is tied to money, to wealth and to an unequal distribution of wealth, or unequal perception of wealth and the power that is assumed with that unequal distribution. It costs a lot of money to make nuclear weapons, develop nuclear weapons, and it also requires an intensive extraction of resources. And some of those resources have come from some of these states that are now standing up and strongly supporting the negotiations towards the prohibition.

ARIEL: Is there anything you recommend the general public can do?

BEATRICE: We have a website that is aimed to the public, to find out a little bit more about this. We can send an email to your Foreign Minister and tweet your Foreign Minister and things like that, it’s called nuclearban.org. We’ll also make sure that the negotiations, when they’re webcast, that we’ll share that link on that website.

ARIEL: Just looking at the nuclear weapons countries, I thought it was very interesting that China, India, and Pakistan abstained from voting, and North Korea actually supported a ban. Did that come as a surprise? What does it mean?

BEATRICE: There’s a lot of dynamics going on in this, which means also that the positions are not fixed. I think countries like Pakistan, India, and China have traditionally been very supportive of the UN as a venue to negotiate disarmament. They are states that perhaps think that Russia and the U.S.—which have much more nuclear weapons—that they are the real problem. They sort of sit on the sides with their smaller arsenals, and perhaps don’t feel as much pressure in the same way that the U.S. and Russia feel to negotiate things.

And also, of course, they have very strong connections with the Southern Hemisphere countries, developing countries. Their decisions on nuclear weapons are very connected to other political issues in international relations. And when it comes to North Korea, I don’t know. It’s very unpredictable. We weren’t expecting them to vote yes, I don’t know if they will come. It’s quite difficult to predict.

ARIEL: What do you say to people who do think we still need nuclear weapons?

SUSI: I ask them why. Why do they think we need nuclear weapons? Under what circumstance is it legitimate to use a weapon that will level a city? One bomb that destroys a city, and that will cause harm not just to the people who are involved in combat. What justifies that kind of horrible use of a weapon? And what are the circumstances that you’re willing to use them? I mean, what are the circumstances where people feel it’s okay to cause this kind of destruction?

BEATRICE: Nuclear weapons are meant to destroy entire cities—that’s their inherent quality. They mass murder entire communities indiscriminately very, very fast. That’s what they are good at. The weapon itself is meant to kill civilians, and that is unacceptable.

And most people that defend nuclear weapons, they admit that they don’t want to use them. They are never supposed to be used, you are just supposed to threaten with them. And then you get into this sort of illogical debate, about how, in order for the threat to be real—and for others to perceive the threat—you have to be serious about using them. It’s very naive to think that we will get away as a civilization without them being used if we keep them around forever.

SUSI: There’s a reason that nuclear weapons have not been used in war in over 70 years: the horror they unleash is too great. Even military leaders, once they retire and are free to speak their minds, say very clearly that these are not a good weapon for military objectives.

ARIEL: I’m still going back to this— Why now? Why are we having success now?

BEATRICE: It’s very important to remember that we’ve had successes before, and very big ones as well. In 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force. And that is the treaty that prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons — the treaty that said, ‘okay, we have these five states, and they’ve already developed weapons, they’re not ready to get rid of them, but at least we’ll cap it there, and no one else is allowed.’ And that really worked quite well. Only four more countries developed nuclear weapons after that. But the rest of the world understood that it was a bad idea. And the big bargain in that treaty was that the five countries that got to keep their nuclear weapons only got to keep them for a while—they committed, that one day they would disarm, but there was no timeline in the treaty. So I think that was a huge success.

In the ‘80s, we saw these huge, huge public mobilization movements and millions of people demonstrating on the street trying to stop the nuclear arms race. And they were very successful as well. They didn’t get total nuclear disarmament, but the nuclear freeze movement achieved a huge victory.

We were very, very close to disarmament at the Reykjavik summit with Gorbachev and Reagan. And that was also a huge success. Governments negotiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prevents countries from testing nuclear weapons. And that hasn’t entered into force yet, but almost all states have signed it. It has not been ratified by some key players, like the United States, but the norm is still there, and it’s been quite an effective treaty despite that it’s not yet entered into force. Only one state has continued testing, and that’s North Korea, since the treaty was signed.

But somewhere along the way we got very focused on non-proliferation and trying to stop the testing, stop them producing fissile material, and we forgot to work on the fundamental delegitimization of nuclear weapons. We forgot to say that nuclear weapons are unacceptable. That is what we’re trying to do right now.

SUSI: The world is different in a lot of ways than it was in 1945. The UN is different in a lot of ways. Remember, one of the purposes of the UN at the outset was to help countries decolonize and to restore them to their own people, and that process took some time. In a lot of those countries, those former colonized societies are coming back and saying, ‘well, we have a voice of global security as well, and this is part of ensuring our security.’

This is the moment where this perfect storm has come; we’re prohibiting illegitimate weapons. It’s going to be fun!

BEATRICE: I think that we’ve been very inspired in ICAN by the campaigns to ban landmines and the campaigns to ban cluster munitions, because they were a different type of treaty. Obviously chemical weapons were prohibited, biological weapons were prohibited, but the landmine and cluster munition processes of prohibition that were developed on those weapons were about stigmatizing the weapon, and they didn’t need all states to be on board with it. And we saw that it worked. Just a few years ago, the United States—who never signed the landmines treaty—announced that it’s basically complying with the treaty. They have one exception at the border of South Korea. That means that they can’t sign it, but otherwise they are complying with it. The market for landmines is pretty much extinct—nobody wants to produce them anymore because countries have banned and stigmatized them.

And with cluster munitions we see a similar trend. We’ve seen those two treaties work, and I think that’s also why we feel confident that we can move ahead this time, even without the nuclear-armed states onboard. It will have an impact anyway.

To learn more about the ban and how you can help encourage your country to support the ban, visit nuclearban.org and icanw.org.

This podcast was edited by Tucker Davey.

Podcast: What Are the Odds of Nuclear War? A Conversation With Seth Baum and Robert de Neufville

Podcast: What Are the Odds of Nuclear War? A Conversation With Seth Baum and Robert de Neufville

What are the odds of a nuclear war happening this century? And how close have we been to nuclear war in the past? Few academics focus on the probability of nuclear war, but many leading voices like former US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, argue that the threat of nuclear conflict is growing.

On this month’s podcast, Ariel spoke with Seth Baum and Robert de Neufville from the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), who recently coauthored a report titled A Model for the Probability of Nuclear War. The report examines 60 historical incidents that could have escalated to nuclear war and presents a model for determining the odds are that we could have some type of nuclear war in the future.

Topics discussed in this episode include:

  • the most hair-raising nuclear close calls in history
  • whether we face a greater risk from accidental or intentional nuclear war
  • China’s secrecy vs the United States’ transparency about nuclear weapons
  • Robert’s first-hand experience with the false missile alert in Hawaii
  • and how researchers can help us understand nuclear war and craft better policy

Links you might be interested in after listening to the podcast:

You can listen to this podcast above or read the transcript.

Podcast: Nuclear Dilemmas, From North Korea to Iran

Podcast: Nuclear Dilemmas, From North Korea to Iran

With the U.S. pulling out of the Iran deal and canceling (and potentially un-canceling) the summit with North Korea, nuclear weapons have been front and center in the news this month. But will these disagreements lead to a world with even more nuclear weapons? And how did the recent nuclear situations with North Korea and Iran get so tense? (Update: The North Korea summit happened! But to understand what the future might look like with North Korea and Iran, it’s still helpful to understand the past.)

To learn more about the geopolitical issues surrounding North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear situations, as well as to learn how nuclear programs in these countries are monitored, Ariel spoke with Melissa Hanham and Dave Schmerler on this month’s podcast. Melissa and Dave are both nuclear weapons experts with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies, where they research weapons of mass destruction with a focus on North Korea. Topics discussed in this episode include:

  • the progression of North Korea’s quest for nukes,
  • what happened and what’s next regarding the Iran deal,
  • how to use open-source data to monitor nuclear weapons testing, and
  • how younger generations can tackle nuclear risk.

In light of the on-again/off-again situation regarding the North Korea Summit, Melissa sent us a quote after the podcast was recorded, saying:

“Regardless of whether the summit in Singapore takes place, we all need to set expectations appropriately for disarmament. North Korea is not agreeing to give up nuclear weapons anytime soon. They are interested in a phased approach that will take more than a decade, multiple parties, new legal instruments, and new technical verification tools.”

Links you might be interested in after listening to the podcast:

You can listen to the podcast above or read the transcript.

Podcast: AI and Nuclear Weapons – Trust, Accidents, and New Risks with Paul Scharre and Mike Horowitz

Podcast: AI and Nuclear Weapons – Trust, Accidents, and New Risks with Paul Scharre and Mike Horowitz

In 1983, Soviet military officer Stanislav Petrov prevented what could have been a devastating nuclear war by trusting his gut instinct that the algorithm in his early-warning system wrongly sensed incoming missiles. In this case, we praise Petrov for choosing human judgment over the automated system in front of him. But what will happen as the AI algorithms deployed in the nuclear sphere become much more advanced, accurate, and difficult to understand? Will the next officer in Petrov’s position be more likely to trust the “smart” machine in front of him?

On this month’s podcast, Ariel spoke with Paul Scharre and Mike Horowitz from the Center for a New American Security about the role of automation in the nuclear sphere, and how the proliferation of AI technologies could change nuclear posturing and the effectiveness of deterrence. Paul is a former Pentagon policy official, and the author of Army of None: Autonomous Weapons in the Future of War. Mike Horowitz is professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, and the author of The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics.

Topics discussed in this episode include:

  • The sophisticated military robots developed by Soviets during the Cold War
  • How technology shapes human decision-making in war
  • “Automation bias” and why having a “human in the loop” is much trickier than it sounds
  • The United States’ stance on automation with nuclear weapons
  • Why weaker countries might have more incentive to build AI into warfare
  • How the US and Russia perceive first-strike capabilities
  • “Deep fakes” and other ways AI could sow instability and provoke crisis
  • The multipolar nuclear world of US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea
  • The perceived obstacles to reducing nuclear arsenals

Publications discussed in this episode include:

You can listen to the podcast above and read the full transcript. Check out our previous podcast episodes on SoundCloud, iTunes, GooglePlay, and Stitcher.

Podcast: Is Nuclear Weapons Testing Back on the Horizon? With Jeffrey Lewis and Alex Bell

FLI Podcast: Is Nuclear Weapons Testing Back on the Horizon? With Jeffrey Lewis and Alex Bell

Nuclear weapons testing is mostly a thing of the past: The last nuclear weapon test explosion on US soil was conducted over 25 years ago. But how much longer can nuclear weapons testing remain a taboo that almost no country will violate? 

In an official statement from the end of May, the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) expressed the belief that both Russia and China were preparing for explosive tests of low-yield nuclear weapons, if not already testing. Such accusations could potentially be used by the U.S. to justify a breach of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The CTBT prohibits all signatories from testing nuclear weapons of any size (North Korea, India, and Pakistan are not signatories). But the CTBT never actually entered into force, in large part because the U.S. has still not ratified it, though Russia did.

The existence of the treaty, even without ratification, has been sufficient to establish the norms and taboos necessary to ensure an international moratorium on nuclear weapons tests for a couple decades. But will that last? Or will the U.S., Russia, or China start testing nuclear weapons again? 

This month, Ariel was joined by Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and founder of armscontrolwonk.com, and Alex Bell, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Lewis and Bell discuss the DIA’s allegations, the history of the CTBT, why it’s in the U.S. interest to ratify the treaty, and more.

Topics discussed in this episode: 

  • The validity of the U.S. allegations –Is Russia really testing weapons?
  • The International Monitoring System — How effective is it if the treaty isn’t in effect?
  • The modernization of U.S/Russian/Chinese nuclear arsenals and what that means
  • Why there’s a push for nuclear testing
  • Why opposing nuclear testing can help ensure the US maintains nuclear superiority 

References discussed in this episode: 

You can listen to the podcast above, or read the full transcript. All of our podcasts are also now on Spotify and iHeartRadio! Or find us on SoundCloudiTunesGoogle Play and Stitcher.