Category: Stanley Center

Evaluating Member State Acceptance of Blockchain for Nuclear Safeguards

Evaluating Member State Acceptance of Blockchain for Nuclear Safeguards

Sarah Frazar, Cindy Vestergaard, Benjamin Loehrke, and Luisa Kenausis | December 2019

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Distributed ledger technology (DLT)–widely referred to as blockchain technology–has the potential to improve operational efficiencies, data security, and confidentiality of nuclear safeguards information. Previous studies have explored these potential capabilities. Yet, as with any new technology involved in nuclear safeguards, there may be technical, legal, or political barriers that might hinder any deployment of DLT systems for safeguards applications.

The Stanley Center for Peace and Security, the Stimson Center, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) coorganized a two-day workshop focusing on understanding those nontechnical factors that may hinder–or motivate–stakeholder acceptance of DLT systems. The workshop included participants from IAEA member states, nuclear operators, state authorities, national missions, blockchain companies, research institutions, and international organizations.

This report summarizes observations and key findings from that workshop. It aims to inform member states and the IAEA about the challenges and opportunities associated with deploying DLT for safeguards purposes. It draws on survey data on how participant perspectives shifted during the workshop. It also explores potential user requirements that should be considered if stakeholders decide to move forward with designing a DLT for safeguards verification and analysis.

Key Findings

  • DLT presents an evolution in computer science while offering new functionalities for safeguards.
  • DLT acceptance will depend, in part, on educating member states about how the technology works. Participants’ views of DLT’s ability to improve operational efficiencies, data security, and confidentiality of safeguards data improved at all levels (operator, state, and IAEA) through the workshop. Education with member states will be particularly important as DLT continues to evolve.
  • DLT offers something above and beyond existing information management systems at the IAEA (e.g., interoperability among systems, frontloading inspection efforts) without replacing the important regulatory function of performing physical verification of nuclear inventories.
  • DLT platforms would not change what safeguards information is reported or undermine the extent to which it is protected from manipulation or theft, two of the most politically charged issues for the international safeguards community.
  • The IAEA—with its limited budget and limited mandate on technology research—is not best positioned to drive investment in DLT systems for safeguards. Although interest among workshop participants in having operators invest in DLT research was relatively low, 76 percent of participants indicated that state authorities should lead the way, possibly because it would be cheaper, less political, and more “exploratory” if a state takes the first leap.
  • While stakeholders perceived legal requirements for adoption to be manageable, political challenges at the IAEA were likely to hinder the technology’s deployment.

While the report explores user requirements for using DLT for safeguards purposes, such applications would need to be tested and validated through prototypes for specific use cases. Lessons from those prototypes can advance the debate about the utility and desirability of using DLT for safeguards purposes.

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The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence

The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence

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Revolutionary technologies hold much promise for humanity. When taken up for military uses, they can affect international peace and security. The challenge is to build understanding among stakeholders about a technology and develop responsive solutions to mitigate risks.

That’s where we might be today with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI).

Militaries are developing systems that use AI for missions ranging from logistics, to decision support, command and control, or even lethal force. Those capabilities seem to be advancing faster than discussions about what the risks might be – including if certain applications could raise safety concerns, stoke arms racing dynamics, or remove breakers to the outbreak of nuclear war.

The Stanley Center, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and the Stimson Center partnered in a workshop and series of papers to facilitate such a discussion among stakeholders. The workshop, held in August 2019 at UN Headquarters, involved experts from member states, industry, academia, and research institutions. These papers capture that conversation. They share assessments of the topic from US, Chinese, and Russian perspectives. In publishing them, we aim to help expand this dialogue to include more stakeholders.

Multistakeholder Perspectives on the Potential Benefits, Risks, and Governance Options for Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Melanie W. Sisson
While AI has the potential to contribute to the well-being of individuals and communities, integration of such systems into national militaries could also disrupt international peace and security.

Introduction: Artificial Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and Strategic Stability
Jennifer Spindel
The problem of training an AI system in the nuclear realm can be illustrated by looking at near-launch decisions made by humans.

Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Potential Risks to International Peace and Security – A US Perspective
Paul Scharre
While the introduction of AI will likely dramatically change the machines used in war, its most profound applications may be in information processing and command and control.

Artificial Intelligence and Its Military Implications – A Chinese Perspective
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
When autonomous weapon systems and AI are employed in warfare, the consequences cannot be overestimated. A legal framework to govern the military use of AI is urgently needed.

Militarization of AI – A Russian Perspective
Vadim Kozyulin
We may be approaching a moment when defense decisions will be increasingly delegated to AI, since limited human capabilities simply will not allow enough time for leadership to deliberate.

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Stanley Center on Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Weapons

To build a safer world that avoids the use of nuclear weapons, the Stanley Center works with diverse stakeholders to develop governance solutions that take advantage of beneficial new technologies—and mitigate their potential risks.

We envision a world where the global community effectively limits the spread and avoids the further use of nuclear weapons.

This vision depends on an efficient and effective constellation of institutions, rules, regimes, and norms. While these approaches remain vital, we must acknowledge that nuclear governance stakeholders today face new, significant challenges as technology development accelerates.

Global efforts to stay apprised of and responsive to the implications of emerging technologies are essential. We must also look for opportunities to take advantage of disruptive technologies. And we must seek to understand and account for potential risks.

Learn more about all of the nuclear efforts at the Stanley Center for Peace and Security.

Nuclear Policy Takes a Deep Dive Into Blockchain

Nuclear Policy Takes a Deep Dive Into Blockchain

Technology Could Ease Information Sharing Among Distrustful Parties

Last year, in a phone conversation about the costs and benefits of blockchain architecture, a source said to me with slight exasperation in his voice, “You know, you don’t need a blockchain to build a swimming pool.” It was meant to be a facetious commentary on the state of the industry. That was spring 2017, and blockchains, or at least the word blockchain, were being slapped on everything.

IBM and Maersk had just built their own blockchain to track international shipments. JP Morgan was deep in a project to issue financial instruments on a blockchain. Before you knew it Disney, Ford Motor Company, Toyota, Anheuser Busch, and even Kodak (yes, the company that makes your film) claimed to be squeezing magic from the blockchain. In blogs and think pieces, writers predicted that blockchain technology would transform artificial intelligence, health care, publishing, and the electrical grid.

Much less, however, was being written about what a blockchain is and how it works. The fact is that blockchain technology is not a magic bullet. Rather, it achieves one very specific thing: coordinating the sharing of data between mistrustful parties in the absence of a central authority. Now that we have this “trust machine,” as some have called it, people are naturally looking for places to apply it, and they are narrowing in on those systems where trust has traditionally been an issue.

For this reason, blockchain has recently become a buzzword in the realm of nuclear policy. “No one trusts each other in nuclear diplomacy,” says Cindy Vestergaard, director of the Nuclear Safeguards Program at the Stimson Center, a policy research group in Washington, DC. “This is, of course, why we have the treaties that we have.”

We have treaties, export laws, and international agencies that safeguard the activity of states in possession of nuclear material. And soon we may have blockchains.

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